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We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness
is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each
good comes in multiple items or copies, and the utility of an agent diminishes as it receives more items of the
same good. The utility of a bundle of items for an agent is the sum of the utilities of the items in the bundle.
Each agent has a utility cap beyond which he does not value additional items. We give a polynomial time
approximation algorithm that maximizes Nash social welfare up to a factor of e1/e ≈ 1.445. The computed
allocation approximates envy-freeness up to one item up to a factor of 2 + ε . For instances without caps, it
is approximately Pareto-optimal. We also show that the upper bounds on the optimal Nash social welfare
introduced in [6] and [3] have the same value.
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1 INTRODUCTION
We consider the task of dividing indivisible goods among a set of n agents in a fair manner. More
precisely, we consider the following scenario. We havem distinct goods. Goods are available in
several copies or items; there are kj items of good j. The agents have decreasing utilities for the
dierent items of a good, i.e., for all i and j
ui, j,1 ≥ ui, j,2 ≥ . . . ≥ ui, j,kj .
An allocation assigns the items to the agents. For an allocation x , xi denotes the multi-set of items
assigned to agent i , andm(j,xi ) denotes the multiplicity of good j in xi . Of course, ∑im(j,xi ) = kj
for all j. The total utility of bundle xi for agent i is given by
ui (xi ) =
∑
j
∑
1≤`≤m(j,xi )
ui, j, ` .
Each agent has a utility cap ci . The capped utility of bundle xi for agent i is dened as
u¯i (xi ) = min(ci ,ui (xi )).
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Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare (NSW) [13], i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric
mean
NSW(x) =
( ∏
1≤i≤n
u¯i (xi )
)1/n
of the capped utilities. All utilities and caps are assumed to be integers. We give a polynomial-time
approximation algorithm with approximation guarantee e1/e + ε ≈ 1.445 + ε for any positive ε .
The problem has a long history. For divisible goods, maximizing Nash Social Welfare (NSW)
for any set of valuation functions can be expressed via an Eisenberg-Gale program [8]. Notably,
for additive valuations (ci = ∞ for each agent i and kj = 1 for each good j) this is equivalent to a
Fisher market with identical budgets. In this way, maximizing NSW is achieved via the well-known
fairness notion of competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) [12].
For indivisible goods, the problem is NP-complete [14] and APX-hard [10]. Several constant-
factor approximation algorithms are known for the case of additive valuations. They use dierent
approaches.
The rst one was pioneered by Cole and Gkatzelis [6] and uses spending-restricted Fisher
markets. Each agent comes with one unit of money to the market. Spending is restricted in the
sense that no seller wants to earn more than one unit of money. If the price p of a good is higher
than one in equilibrium, only a fraction 1/p of the good is sold. Cole and Gkatzelis showed how to
compute a spending restricted equilibrium in polynomial time and how to round its allocation to
an integral allocation with good NSW. In the original paper they obtained an approximation ratio
of 2e1/e ≈ 2.889. Subsequent work [5] improved the ratio to 2. The approximation ratio in [6] is
shown against an upper bound on the optimal Nash social welfare which we refer to as CG-bound.
In [5], an alternative bound is introduced and shown to have the same value as the CG-bound.
The second approach is via stable polynomials. Anari et al. [1] obtained an approximation factor
of e .
The third approach, introduced by Barman et al. [3], is via integral allocations that are envy-free
up to one good. An allocation is envy-free up to one good if for any two agents i and k there is a
good j such that ui (xk − j) ≤ ui (xi ), i.e., after removal of one good from k’s bundle its utility for i
is no larger than the utility of i’s bundle for i . Caragiannis et al. [4] have shown that an allocation
maximizing NSW is Pareto-optimal and envy-free up to one good. For a price vector p for the
goods, the price P(xi ) of a bundle is the sum of the prices of the goods in the bundle. An allocation
is almost price-envy-free up to one good (ε-p-EF1) if P(xk − j) ≤ (1 + ε)P(xi ) for all agents i and k
and some good j, where ε is an approximation parameter. An allocation is MBB (maximum bang
per buck) if j ∈ xi implies ui j/pj = max` ui`/p` for all j and i . Barman et al. [3] studied allocations
that are MBB and almost price-envy-free up to one good. They showed that such allocations are
almost envy-free up to one good1 and approximate NSW up to a factor e1/e + ε ≈ 1.445 + ε . They
also showed how to compute such an allocation in polynomial time. The approximation ratio
in [3] is shown against an upper bound on the optimal Nash social welfare which we refer to as
BMV-bound. We show that it has the same value as the CG-bound.
There are also constant-factor approximation algorithms beyond additive utilities.
Garg et al. [9] studied budget-additive utilities (kj = 1 for all goods j and arbitrary ci ). They
showed how to generalize the Fisher market approach and obtained an 2e1/2e ≈ 2.404-approximation.
1Consider two bundles xk and xi and assume P (xk − j) ≤ (1 + ε )P (xi ) for some j ∈ xk . Let αi = max` ui`/p` . Then
ui (xk − j) =
∑
`∈xk−j ui` ≤ αi
∑
`∈xk−j p` ≤ (1 + ε )αi
∑
`∈xi p` = (1 + ε )
∑
`∈xi ui` .
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Anari et al. [2] investigated multi-item concave utilities (ci = ∞ for all i and kj arbitrary). They
generalized the Fisher market and the stable polynomial approach and obtained approximation
factors of 2 and e2, respectively.
We show that the price-envy-free allocation approach can handle both generalizations simulta-
neously. We obtain an approximation ratio of e1/e + ε ≈ 1.445 + ε . The allocation computed by
our algorithm guarantees ui (xk − j) ≤ (2 + ε)ui (xi ) for any two agents i and k , i.e., it approximates
envy-freeness up to one item up to a factor of essentially two. For instances without utility caps, it
is approximately Pareto-optimal2 The approach via price-envy-freeness does not only yield better
approximation ratios and guarantees for individual agents, it is, in our opinion, also simpler to
state and simpler to analyze.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give the algorithm and analyze its approxima-
tion ratio (Section 2.3), guarantee to individual agents (Section 2.4), and running time (Section 2.5).
In Section 3 we show that the analysis is essentially tight by establishing a lower bound of 1.44 on
the approximation ratio of the algorithm. In Section 4 we discuss certication of the approximation
ratio and in Section 5 we show that for the multi-copy case and the capped case optimal allocations
are not necessarily envy-free up to one good. In Section 6 we obtain close-to-one approximation
ratios for large markets, where for any agent the value of any good is only an ϵ/n-fraction of the
value of all goods. In Section 7 we show the equality of the CG- and BMV-bounds.
2 ALGORITHM AND ANALYSIS
Let us recall the setting. Items are indivisible. There are n agents andm goods. There are kj items or
copies of good j. Let M =
∑
j kj be the total number of items. The agents have decreasing utilities
for the dierent items of a good, i.e., for all i and j
ui, j,1 ≥ ui, j,2 ≥ . . . ≥ ui, j,kj .
For an allocation x , xi denotes the multi-set of items assigned to agent i , andm(j,xi ) denotes the
multiplicity of good j in xi . The total utility of bundle xi for agent i is given by
ui (xi ) =
∑
j
∑
1≤`≤m(j,xi )
ui, j, ` .
Each agent has a utility cap ci . The capped utility of bundle xi for agent i is dened as
u¯i (xi ) = min(ci ,ui (xi )).
Following [9], we assume w.l.o.g. ui, j, ` ≤ ci for all i , j, and `. In the algorithm, we ensure this
assumption by capping every ui,∗,∗ at ci . All utilities and caps are assumed to be integers.
2.1 A Reduction to Rounded Utilities and Caps
Let r ∈ (1, 3/2]. For every non-zero utility ui, j, ` let vi, j, ` be the next larger power of r . For zero
utilities v and u agree. Similarly, for ci let di be the next larger power of r . It is well-known that it
suces to solve the rounded problem with a good approximation guarantee.
Lemma 2.1. Let x approximate the NSW for the rounded problem up to a factor of γ . Then x
approximates the NSW for the original problem up to a factor γr .
2The algorithm rounds each non-zero utility to the next larger power of r = 1 + ε . For instances without utility caps, it
computes a Pareto-optimal allocation for the rounded utilities. It also computes a scaling factor αi for each agent i such that
for each integral allocation y of the goods
∑
i ui (yi )/αi ≤ r ·
∑
i ui (x algi )/αi . For r = 1, this would imply Pareto-optimality
of x alg . For instances without caps, it can eciently compute a Pareto-optimal solution if all numbers are polynomially
bounded. In contrast, even for identical agents with additive utilities and caps, computing a Pareto-optimal solution is
strongly NP-hard via a standard reduction from 3-PARTITION.
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Proof. Let x∗ be an optimal allocation for the original problem. We write NSW(x∗,u, c) for the
Nash social welfare of the allocation x∗ with respect to utilities u and caps c . Dene NSW(x ,u, c),
NSW(x∗,v,d), and NSW(x ,v,d) analogously. We need to bound NSW(x∗,u, c)/NSW(x ,u, c). Since
u ≤ v and c ≤ d componentwise, NSW(x∗,u, c) ≤ NSW(x∗,v,d). Since x approximates the NSW
for the rounded problem up to a factor γ , NSW(x∗,v,d) ≤ γNSW(x ,v,d). Since v ≤ ru and d ≤ rc
componentwise, NSW(x ,v,d) ≤ rNSW(x ,u, c). Thus
NSW(x∗,u, c)
NSW(x ,u, c) ≤
γNSW(x ,v,d)
NSW(x ,v,d)/r = γr .

2.2 The Algorithm
Barman et al. [3] gave a highly elegant approximation algorithm for the case of a single copy per
good and no utility caps. We generalize their approach. The algorithm uses an approximation
parameter ε ∈ (0, 1/4]. Let r = 1 + ε . The nonzero utilities are assumed to be powers of r .
The algorithm maintains an integral assignment x , a price pj for each good, and an MBB-ratio3 αi
for each agent. Of course,
∑
im(j,xi ) = kj for each good j . The prices, MBB-ratios, and multiplicity
of goods in bundles are related through the following inequalities:
ui, j,m(j,xi )+1
pj
≤ αi ≤
ui, j,m(j,xi )
pj
, (1)
i.e., if ui, j, `/pj > αi , then at least ` copies of j are allocated to agent i and if ui, j, `/pj < αi , then less
than ` copies of j are allocated to agent i . If no copy of good j is assigned to i , the upper bound for
αi is innity. If all copies of good j are assigned to i , the lower bound for αi is zero. Note that if αi
is equal to its upper bound in (1), we may take one copy of j away from i without violating the
inequality as the upper bound becomes the new lower bound. Similarly, if αi is equal to its lower
bound in (1), we may assign an additional copy of j to i without violating the inequality as the
lower bound becomes the new upper bound. Since (1) must hold for every good j, αi must lie in
the intersection of the intervals for the dierent goods j, i.e.,
max
j
ui, j,m(j,xi )+1
pj
≤ αi ≤ min
j
ui, j,m(j,xi )
pj
.
The value of bundle xi for i is given by4
Pi (xi ) = ui (xi )
αi
=
1
αi
∑
j
∑
1≤`≤m(j,xi )
ui, j, ` . (2)
Denitions (1) and (2) are inspired by Anari et al [2]. We say that αi is equal to the upper bound
for the pair (i, j) if αi is equal to its upper bound in (1) and that αi is equal to the lower bound for
the pair (i, j) if αi is equal to its lower bound in (1).
An agent i is capped if ui (xi ) ≥ ci and is uncapped otherwise.
The algorithm starts with a greedy assignment. For each good j , it assigns each copy to the agent
that values it most. The price of each good is set to the utility of the assignment of its last copy and
all MBB-values are set to one. Note that this setting guarantees (1) for every pair (i, j). Also, all
3In the case of one copy per good, αi = ui, j /pj whenever (the single copy of) good j is assigned to i and αi ≥ ui, `/p` for
all goods `. Thus αi is the maximum utility per unit of money (maximum bang per buck (MBB)) that agent i can get.
4In the case of one copy per good, Pi (xi ) = ui (xi )/αi = ∑j∈xi pj is the total price of the goods in the bundle. We reuse
the letter P for the value of a bundle, although Pi (xi ) = 1/αi ·∑j ∑1≤`≤m(j,xi ) ui, j, ` is no longer the total price of the
goods in the bundle.
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Algorithm 1: Approximate Nash Social Welfare for Multi Item Concave Utilities with Caps
Input :Fair Division Problem given by utilities ui j` , i ≤ n, j ≤ m, ` ≤ kj , utility caps ci , and
approximation parameter ε ∈ (0, 1/4]. Let r = 1 + ε . Nonzero ui j ’s and ci ’s are powers of r .
Output :Price vector p and 4ε-p-EF1 integral allocation x
1 for i, j, ` do
2 ui, j, ` ← min(ci ,ui, j, `)
3 for j ∈ G do
4 for ` ∈ [kj ] in increasing order do
5 assign the `-th copy of j to i0 = argmaxi ui, j,m(j,xi )+1;
6 Set pj ← ui0, j,m(j,xi0 ), where i0 is the agent to which the kj -th copy of j was assigned
7 for i ∈ A do
8 αi = 1
9 while true do
10 if allocation x is ε-p-EF1 then
11 break from the loop and terminate
12 Let i be a least spending uncapped agent
13 Perform a BFS in the tight graph starting at i
14 if the BFS-search discovers an improving path starting in i , let P = (i = a0,д1,a1, . . . ,дh ,ah ) be a
shortest such path then
15 Set ` ← h
16 while ` > 0 and Pa` (xa` − д`) > (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) do
17 remove д` from xa` and assign it to a`−1; ` ← ` − 1
18 else
19 Let S be the set of goods and agents that can be reached from i in the tight graph
20 β1 ← mink ∈S ; j<S αk/(uk, j,m(j,xk )+1/pj ) (add a good to S)
21 β2 ← mink<S ; j ∈S (uk, j,m(j,xk )/pj )/αk (add an agent to S)
22 β3 ← 1r 2Pi (xi ) maxk<S minj ∈xk Pk (xk − j) (i is happy)
23 β4 ← r s , where s is the smallest integer such that r s−1 ≤ Ph (xh )/Pi (xi ) < r s and h is the least
spending uncapped agent outside S (new least spender)
24 β ← min(β1, β2,max(1, β3), β4)
25 multiply all prices of goods in S by β and divide all MBB-values of agents in S by β
26 if β3 ≤ min(β1, β2, β4) then
27 break from the while-loop
initial prices and MBB-values are powers of r . It is an invariant of the algorithm that prices are
powers of r . Only the nal price increase in the main-loop may destroy this invariant.
After initialization, the algorithm enters a loop. We need some more denitions. An agent i is a
least spending uncapped agent if it is uncapped and Pi (xi ) ≤ Pk (xk ) for every other uncapped agent
k . An agent i ε-p-envies agent k up to one item if Pk (xk − j) > (1 + ε) · Pi (xi ) for every good j ∈ xk .
Recall that xk is a multi-set. In the multi-set xk − j, the number of copies of good j is reduced by
one, i.e.,m(j,xk − j) =m(j,xk ) − 1. Therefore Pk (xk − j) = Pk (xk ) − uk, j,m(j,xk )/αk . An allocation
is ε-p-envy free up to one item (ε-p-EF1) if for every uncapped agent i and every other agent k there
is a good j such that Pk (xk − j) ≤ (1 + ε)Pi (xi ).
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i j1 i1 j2 jh ih
= good
= agent = at lower bound
= at upper bound
Fig. 1. An improving path. Agents and goods alternate on the path and the path starts and ends with an
agent. For the solid edges (j, i), αi is at its upper bound for the pair (i, j) and for the dashed edges (i, j), αi is
at its lower bound for the pair (i, j).
We also need the notion of the tight graph. It is a directed bipartite graph with the agents on
one side and the goods on the other side. We have a directed edge (i, j) from agent i to good j if
αi = ui jm(j,xi )+1/pj , i.e., αi is at its lower bound for the pair (i, j). We have a directed edge (j, i)
from good j to agent i if αi = ui jm(j,xi )/pj , i.e., αi is at its upper bound for the pair (i, j). Note that
necessarilym(j,xi ) ≥ 1 in the latter case, since otherwise good j does not impose an upper bound
for αi .
An improving path starting at an agent i is a simple path P = (i = a0,д1,a1, . . . ,дh ,ah) in the
tight graph starting at i and ending at another agent ah such that Pah (xah − дh) > (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) and
Pa` (xa` − д`) ≤ (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) for 1 ≤ ` < h.
Let i be the least spending uncapped agent. We perform a breadth-rst search in the tight graph
starting at i . If the BFS discovers an improving path starting at i , we use the shortest such path
to improve the allocation. Note that if i ε-p-envies some node that is reachable from i in the tight
graph then the BFS will discover an improving path.
In the main loop, we distinguish cases according to whether BFS discovers an improving path
starting at i or not.
Assume rst that BFS discovers the improving path P = (i = a0,д1,a1, . . . ,дh ,ah). We take дh
away from ah and assign it to ah−1. If we now have Pah−1 (xah−1 +дh −дh−1) ≤ (1+ ε)Pi (xi ) we stop.
Otherwise, we take дh−1 away from ah−1 and assign it to ah−2. If we now have Pah−2 (xah−2 + дh−1 −
дh−2) ≤ (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) we stop. Otherwise, . . . . We continue in this way until we stop or assign д1 to
a0. In other words, let h′ < h be maximum such that Pah′ (xah′ + дh′+1 − дh′) ≤ (1 + ε)Pi (xi ). If h′
exists, then we take a copy of д` away from a` and assign it to a`−1 for h′ < ` ≤ h. If h′ does not
exist, we do so for 1 ≤ ` ≤ h. Let us call the above a sequence of swaps.
Lemma 2.2. Consider an execution of lines (15) to (17) and let h′ be the nal value of ` (this agrees
with the denition of h′ in the preceding paragraph). Let x ′ be the resulting allocation. Then x ′
`
= x`
for 0 ≤ ` < h′, x ′h′ = xh′ + дh′+1, x ′` = x` + д`+1 − д` for h′ < ` < h, and x ′h = xh − дh . Also,
• Pah (xah ) ≥ Pah (x ′ah ) > (1 + ε)Pi (xi ),• Pah′ (x ′ah′ − дh′) = Pah′ (xah′ + дh′+1 − дh′) ≤ (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) if h′ ≥ 1• Pa0 (x ′a0 − д1) = Pa0 (xa0 ) ≤ (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) if h′ = 0.• Pa` (x ′a` ) = Pa` (xa` + д`+1 − д`) > (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) and Pa` (x ′a` − д`+1) = Pa` (xa` − д`) ≤(1 + ε)Pi (xi ) for h′ < ` < h.
• Pa` (x ′a` − д`) = Pa` (xa` − д`) ≤ (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) for 0 ≤ ` < h′.
Proof. Immediate from the above. 
If i is still the least spending uncapped agent after an execution of lines (15) to (17), we search
for another improving path starting from i . We will show below that i can stay the least spending
agent for at most n2M iterations. Intuitively this holds because for any agent (factor n) and any
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xed length shortest improving path (factor n), we can have at most M iterations for which the
shortest improving path ends in this particular agent.
We come to the else-case, i.e., BFS does not discover an improving path starting at i . This implies
that i does not ε-p-envy any agent that it can reach in the tight graph. We then increase some
prices and decrease some MBB-values. Let S be the set of agents and goods that can be reached
from i in the tight graph.
Lemma 2.3. If a good j belongs to S and αk is at its upper bound for the pair (k, j), then k belongs to
S . If an agent k belongs to S and αk is at its lower bound for the pair (k, j), then j belongs to S .
Proof. Consider any good j ∈ S . Since j belongs to S , there is an alternating path starting in i
and ending in j . If the path contains k , k belongs to S . If the path does not contain k , we can extend
the path by k . In either case, k belongs to S .
Consider any agent k ∈ S . Since k belongs to S , there is an alternating path starting in i and
ending in k . If the path contains j, j belongs to S . If the path does not contain j, we can extend the
path by j. In either case, j belongs to S . 
We multiply all prices of goods in S and divide all MBB-values of agents in S by a common factor
t ≥ 1. What is the eect?
• Let uk, j,(j,xk )+1/pj ≤ αk ≤ uk, j,m(j,xk )/pj be the inequality (1) for the pair (k, j). The
endpoints do not move if j < S and are divided by t for j ∈ S . Similarly, αk does not move if
k < S and are divided by t if k ∈ S . So in order to preserve the inequality, we must have: If
αk is equal to the upper endpoint and pj moves, i.e., j ∈ S , then αk must also move. If αk is
equal to the lower endpoint and αk moves then pj must also move. Both conditions are
guaranteed by Lemma 2.3.
• If k and j are both in S , then αk and the endpoints of the interval for (k, j) move in sync. So
agents and goods reachable from i in the tight graph, stay reachable.
• If k < S , there might be a j ∈ S such that αk becomes equal to the right endpoint of the
interval for (k, j). Then k is added to S .
• If k ∈ S , there might be a j < S such that αk becomes equal to the left endpoint of the
interval for (k, j). Then j is added to S .
• For agents in S , Pk (xk ) is multiplied by t . For agents outside S , Pk (xk ) stays unchanged.
How is the common factor t chosen? There are four limiting events. Either S grows and this may
happen by the addition of a good (factor β1) or an agent (factor β2); or Pi (xi ) comes close to the
largest value of minj ∈xk Pk (xk − j) for any other agent (factor β3), or Pi (xi ) becomes larger than
Ph(xh) for some uncapped agent h outside S (factor β4). Since we want prices to stay powers of
r , β4 is chosen as a power of r . The factor β3 might be smaller than one. Since we never want to
decrease prices, we take the maximum of 1 and β3.
Lemma 2.4. Prices and MBB-values are powers of r , except maybe at termination.
Proof. This is true initially, since prices are utility values and utility values are assumed to
be powers of r and since MBB-values are equal to one. If prices and MBB-values are powers of
r before a price update, β1, β2, and β4 are powers of r . Thus prices and MBB-values are after the
price update, except maybe when the algorithm terminates. 
We next show that the algorithm terminates with an allocation that is almost price-envy-free up
to one item.
Lemma 2.5. Assume ε ≤ 1/4. When the algorithm terminates, x is a 4ε-p-EF1 allocation.
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Proof. Let q be the price vector after the price increase and let h be the least spending uncapped
agent after the increase; h = i is possible. We rst show that thatQi (xi ) ≤ rQh(xh). This is certainly
true if h = i . If h < S , since the price increase is limited by β4, we have
Qi (xi ) = βPi (xi ) ≤ β4Pi (xi ) = r · r s−1 · Pi (xi ) ≤ rPh(xh) = rQh(xh).
So in either case, we have Qi (xi ) ≤ rQh(xh). Moreover, Qh(xh) ≤ Qi (xi ) because h is a least
spending uncapped agent after the price increase.
If the algorithm terminates, we have β3 ≤ β4. Consider any agent k . Then, for k ∈ S ,
Qk (xk − jk ) ≤ (1 + ε)Qi (xi ) ≤ (1 + ε) · r ·Qh(xh)
and, for k < S ,
Qk (xk − jk ) = Pk (xk − jk ) ≤ β3(1 + ε)rPi (xi ) = (1 + ε)rQi (xi ) ≤ (1 + ε) · r 2 ·Qh(xh).
Thus we are returning an allocation that is ((1 + ε)r 2 − 1)-q-EF1. Finally, note that (1 + ε)r 2 =
(1 + ε)3 ≤ (1 + 4ε) for ε ≤ 1/4. 
Remark: We want to point out the dierences to the algorithm by Barman et al. Our denition of
alternating path is more general than theirs since it needs to take into account that the number of
items of a particular good assigned to an agent may change. For this reason, we need to maintain
the MBB-ratio explicitly. In the algorithm by Barman et al. the MBB ratio of agent i is equal to
the maximum utility to price ratio maxj ui j/pj and only MBB goods can be assigned to an agent.
As a consequence, if a good belongs to S , the agent owning it also belongs to S . In price changes,
there is no need for the quantity β2. In the denition of β3, we added an additional factor r 2 in the
denominator. We cannot prove polynomial running time without this factor. Finally, we start the
search for an improving path from the least uncapped agent and not from the least agent.
2.3 Analysis of the Approximation Factor
The analysis renes the analysis given by Barman et al. Let (xalg,p,α) denote the allocation and
price and MBB vector returned by the algorithm. Recall that xalg is γ -p-EF1 with γ = 4ε with
respect to p and (1) holds for every i . We scale all the utilities of agent i and its utility cap by αi ,
i.e., we replace ui, j, ` by ui, j, `/αi and ci by ci/αi and use ui, j, ` and ci also for the scaled utilities
and scaled utility cap. The scaling does not change the integral allocation maximizing Nash Social
Welfare. Inequality (1) becomes
ui, j,m(j,x algi )+1
pj
≤ 1 ≤
ui, j,m(j,x algi )
pj
, (3)
i.e., the items allocated to i have a utility to price ratio of one or more and the items that are not
allocated to i have a ratio of one or less. Also, the value of bundle xi for i is now equal to its utility
for i and is given by
Pi (xalgi ) = ui (xalgi ) =
∑
j
∑
1≤`≤m(j,x algi )
ui, j, ` . (4)
All ui,∗,∗ are at most ci .
Let Ac and Au be the set of capped and uncapped agents in xalg , let c = |Ac | and n − c = |Au |
be their cardinalities. We number the uncapped agents such that u1(xalg1 ) ≥ u2(xalg2 ) ≥ . . . ≥
un−c (xalgn−c ). Let ` = un−c (xalgn−c ) be the minimum utility of a bundle assigned to an uncapped agent.
The capped agents are numbered n − c + 1 to n. Let x∗ be an integral allocation maximizing Nash
social welfare.
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We dene an auxiliary problem with
∑
j kj goods and one copy of each good. The goods are
denoted by triples (i, j, `), where 1 ≤ ` ≤ m(j,xalgi ). The utility of good (i, j, `) is uniform for all
agents and is equal to ui, j, ` . Formally,
v∗,(i, j, `) = ui, j, `, (5)
where v is the utility function for the auxiliary problem. The cap of agent i is ci . Since v is uniform,
we can write v(xi ) instead of vi (xi ). The capped utility of xi for agent i is v¯i (xi ) = min(ci ,v(xi )).
Note that v is uniform, but v¯ is not. Let xoptaux be an optimal allocation for the auxiliary problem.
Lemma 2.6. Let ui be the scaled utilities. Then we have:
(1) xalg maximizes the uncapped social welfare, i.e., xalg = arg maxx
∑
i ui (xi ).
(2)
∑
i ui (x∗i ) ≤
∑
i ui (xalgi ) =
∑
i, j,1≤`≤m(j,x algi )
v∗,(i, j, `).
(3) xalg is Pareto-optimal for uncapped utilities.
(4) NSW(x∗) = (∏i u¯i (x∗i ))1/n ≤ (∏i v¯i (xoptauxi ))1/n = NSW(xoptaux).
(5) Let uorig be the unrounded original utilities. Then for any integral allocation y of the goods,∑
i u
orig
i (yi )/αi ≤ r ·
∑
i u
orig
i (xalgi )/αi .
Proof. For part (1) consider xSW as the allocation that maximizes the uncapped social welfare
for the scaled utilities. We can obtain x∗SW from x
alg by moving copies of goods as follows:
Set x ← xalg . Consider any good j . As long as the multiplicities of j in the bundles of x and xSW
are not the same, identify two agents i and k , where xi contains more copies of j than xSWi and xk
contains fewer copies of j than xSWk , and move a copy of j from i to k . Each copy taken away has
a utility of at least pj , each copy assigned additionally has a utility of at most pj . Thus the social
welfare cannot go up by reassigning. This proves (a).
Part (2) is an obvious consequence of part (1).
For part (3), we need to show that if agents have no utility caps, then there is no other allocation
y that satises ui (yi ) ≥ ui (xalgi ) for all agents i , with strict inequality for at least one agent. This
follows directly from part (1). Note that scaling does not aect the Pareto inequalities, thus part (3)
also holds for unscaled uncapped utilities.
For part (4), we interpret xalg as an allocation for the auxiliary problem; goods (i, j, `) with
1 ≤ ` ≤ m(j,xalgi ) are allocated to agent i . We then move goods exactly as in (1). We obtain an
allocation xˆ for the auxiliary problem with ui (x∗i ) ≤ v(xˆi ) for all i .
For part (5), we observe that uorigi (yi ) ≤ ui (yi ) since each original non-zero utility is scaled up to
the next power of r ,
∑
i ui (yi )/αi ≤
∑
i ui (xalgi )/αi by part (c), and ui (xalgi ) ≤ r · uorigi (xalgi ). 
We stress that Lemma 2.6 refers to the scaled utilities; xalg does not maximize social welfare for
the unscaled utilities.
For any agent i , let bi ∈ xalgi be such that ui (xalgi − bi ) ≤ (1 + γ )`. Note that ui (xalgi − bi ) =
ui (xalgi ) − ui,bi ,m(bi ,x algi ). Let B = { (i,bi ,m(bi ,x
alg
i )) ; 1 ≤ i ≤ n } be the goods in the auxiliary
problem corresponding to the bi ’s. We now consider allocations for the auxiliary problem that are
allowed to be partially fractional. We require that the goods in B are allocated integrally and allow
all other goods to be assigned fractionally. For convenience of notation, let дi = (i,bi ,m(bi ,xalgi )).
The following lemma is crucial for the analysis.
Lemma 2.7. There is an optimal allocation for the relaxed auxiliary problem in which good дi is
allocated to agent i .
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Proof. Assume otherwise. Among the allocations maximizing Nash social welfare for the
relaxed auxiliary problem, let xoptrel be the one that maximizes the number of agents i that are
allocated their own good дi .
Assume rst that there is an agent i to which no good in B is allocated. Then дi is allocated to
some agent k dierent from i . Since bi ∈ xalgi ,v(дi ) = ui,bi ,m(bi ,x algi ) ≤ ci . The inequality holds since
utilities ui,∗,∗ are capped at ci during initialization. We move дi from k to i and min(v(дi ),v(xoptreli ))
value from i to k . This is possible since only divisible goods are allocated to i . If we move v(дi )
from i to k , the NSW does not change. If v(дi ) > v(xoptreli ) and hence ci ≥ v(дi ) > v(xoptreli ), the
product v¯i (xi ) · v¯k (xk ) changes from
min(ci ,v(xoptreli )) ·min(ck ,v(xoptrelk − дi + дi ))
= min(ckv(xoptreli ),v(xoptrelk − дi )v(x
optrel
i ) +v(дi )v(xoptreli ))
to
min(ci ,v(дi )) ·min(ck ,v(xoptrelk − дi + x
optrel
i ))
min(ckv(дi ),v(xoptrelk −v(дi ))v(дi ) +v(x
optrel
i )v(дi )).
The arguments of the min in the lower line are componentwise larger than those of the min in the
upper line. We have now modied xoptrel such that the NSW did not decrease and the number of
agents owning their own good increased. The above applies as long as there is an agent owning no
good in B.
So assume every agent i owns a good in B, but not necessarily дi . Let i be such that v(дi ) is
largest among all goods дi that are not allocated to their i . Then дi is allocated to some agent k
dierent from i . The value of the good д` allocated to i is at most v(дi ) since ` , i and by the
choice of i . We move дi from k to i and min(v(дi ),v(xoptreli )) value from i to k . This is possible since
v(д`) ≤ v(дi ) and all other goods assigned to i are divisible. We have now modied xoptrel such
that the NSW did not decrease and the number of agents owning their own good increased. We
continue in this way until дi is allocated to i for every i . 
Let xoptrel be an optimal allocation for the relaxed auxiliary problem in which good дi is contained
in the bundle xoptreli for every i . Let α be such that
α` = min{v(xoptreli ) ; v(xoptreli ) < ci }
is the minimum value of any agent that is uncapped in xoptrel . Let α = ∞, if every agent is capped
in xoptrel . Let Aoptrelc and A
optrel
u be the set of capped and uncapped agents in xoptrel . Let h be such
that uh(xalgh ) > α` ≥ uh+1(x
alg
h+1).
Lemma 2.8. For i ≤ h, v(xoptreli ) ≤ ui (xalgi ). For all i , ui (xalgi ) ≤ v(xoptreli ) + (1 + γ )`. For i ∈
Au ∩Aoptrelc , ci ≤ α` and i < [h].
Proof. Consider any i ≤ h. v(xoptreli ) ≤ ui (xalgi ) is obvious, if v(xoptreli ) ≤ α`. If v(xoptreli ) > α`,
then α < ∞ and hence Aoptrelu is non-empty. We claim that xoptreli = {дi }, i.e., xoptreli is a singleton
consisting only of дi . Assume otherwise, then also some divisible goods are assigned to i . We can
move some of them to an agent that is uncapped in xoptrel and has value α`. This increases the
NSW, a contradiction.
For the upper bound, we observe that дi ∈ xoptreli and ui (xalgi − bi ) ≤ (1 + γ )`.
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Consider next any i ∈ Au ∩Aoptrelc . Assume ci > α`. If xoptrel assigns divisible goods to i , we can
move some of them to an agent that is uncapped in xoptrel and has value α`. This increases the
NSW. Thus xoptreli consists only of дi . But then v(дi ) ≤ ui (xalgi ) < ci and i does not belong to Aoptrelc .
This shows ci ≤ α`. Then also i < [h] because otherwise ci < ui (xalgi ) and hence i would be capped
in xalg . 
Lemma 2.9.
NSW(x∗) ≤ NSW(xoptrel) ≤ ©­­«(α`)n−c−h−|Au∩A
optrel
c | ·
∏
i ∈Ac∪(Au∩Aoptrelc )
ci ·
∏
1≤i≤h
ui (xalgi )
ª®®¬
1
n
.
Moreover, ci ≤ α` for any i ∈ Au ∩Aoptrelc .
Proof. If v(xoptreli ) , α` then either i ∈ Ac or i ∈ Au ∩Aoptrelc or i ∈ Au \Aoptrelc . In the rst case,
v(xoptreli ) ≤ ci . In the second case, v(xoptreli ) = ci ≤ α` and i < [h] by Lemma 2.8. In the third case,
v(xoptreli ) ≤ ui (xalgi ) for i ≤ h. So assume i > h. Then v(дi ) ≤ ui (xalgi ) ≤ α` and hence all value in
v(xoptreli ) above α` would be by fractional goods. They could be reassigned for an increase in NSW.
We conclude that for the agents i ∈ Au \Aoptrelc with i > h, we have v(xoptreli ) = α`. 
We next bound NSW(xalg) from below. We consider assignments x for the auxiliary problem
that agree with xalg for the agents in Ac ∪ [h] and reassign the value ∑i ∈Au−[h] ui (xalgi ) fractionally.
Note that for any i ∈ Au − [h], ` ≤ ui (xalgi ) ≤ min(ci ,α`). The former inequality follows from
i ∈ Au and the latter inequality follows from the denition of h and i ∈ Au . We reallocate value
so as to move ui (xi ) towards the bounds ` and min(ci ,α`). As long as there are two agents whose
value is not at one of their bounds, we shift value from the smaller to the larger. This decreases
NSW. We end when all but one agent have an extreme allocation, either ` or min(ci ,α`). One agent
ends up with an allocation β` with β ∈ [1,α].
Let us introduce some more notation. Write Au ∩Aoptrelc as S ∪T , where the agents i ∈ T end up
at ci and the agents in S end up at `. Also let s and t be the number of agents in Au \Aoptrelc that
end up at ` and α` respectively. Then
NSW(xalg) ≥
(∏
i ∈Ac
ci ·
∏
1≤i≤h
ui (xalgi ) · `s · (α`)t · (β`) ·
∏
i ∈T
ci · ` |S |
)1/n
.
Note that n − c − h = s + t + 1 + |S | + |T |. Therefore
NSW(x∗)
NSW(xalg) ≤
(
α s · α
β
·
∏
i ∈S
ci
`
)1/n
≤ ©­«
(
sα + αβ +
∑
i ∈S
ci
`
s + 1 + |S |
)s+1+ |S |ª®¬
1/n
,
where we used the inequality between geometric mean and arithmetic mean for the second
inequality.
The total mass allocated by xoptrel to the agents in Au − [h] is (s + t + 1)α` + ∑i ∈S∪T ci . The
allocation xalg wastes up to (1 + γ )` for each i ∈ Ac ∪ [h] and uses s` + tα` + β` +∑i ∈T ci + |S |`
on the agents in Au − [h]. Therefore
(s + t + 1)α` +
∑
i ∈S∪T
ci ≤ (|Ac | + h)(1 + γ )` + s` + tα` + β` +
∑
i ∈T
ci + |S |`
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1 + γ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04
exp(exp(−1/(1 + γ ))) 1.44467 1.44997 1.45523 1.46046 1.46566
Table 1. The factor exp(exp(−1/(1 + γ ))) as a function of 1 + γ .
and hence after rearranging, dividing by ` and adding α/β on both sides
sα +
α
β
+
∑
i ∈S
ci
`
≤ (1 + γ )(|Ac | + h) + s + |S | + α
β
+ β − α
≤ (1 + γ )(|Ac | + h) + s + |S | + 1 ≤ (1 + γ )n.
Note that β + α/β − α ≤ 1 for β ∈ [1,α], since the expression is one at β = 1 and β = α and it
second derivative as function of β is positive. Thus
NSW(xoptrel)
NSW(xalg) ≤
(( (1 + γ )(|Ac | + h) + s + |S | + 1
s + 1 + |S |
)s+1+ |S |)1/n
≤
( (1 + γ )n
s + 1 + |S |
) (s+1+ |S |)/n
≤ ee−1/(1+γ ) ,
since ((1 + γ )δ )1/δ as a function of δ attains its maximum for δ = 1(1+γ )e1/(1+γ ). The value of the
maximum is exp(exp(−1/(1 + γ ))). Table 1 contains concrete values for small non-negative values
of γ .
Theorem 2.10. Let ε ∈ (0, 1/4], let γ = 4ε , let xalg be the allocation computed by the algorithm
for the rounded utilities and caps, and let x∗ be an allocation maximizing Nash social welfare for the
rounded utilities and caps. Then
NSW(x∗)/NSW(xalg) ≤ ee−1/(1+γ ) .
Corollary 2.11. ε ∈ (0, 1/4], let r = 1 + ε , let γ = 4ε , let xalg be the allocation computed by the
algorithm for the utilities and caps rounded to powers of r , and let x∗ be an allocation maximizing
Nash social welfare for the original utilities and caps. Then
NSW(x∗)/NSW(xalg) ≤ r · ee−1/(1+γ ) .
2.4 Guarantees for Individual Agents
The allocation computed by our algorithm maximizes NSW up to a factor 1.45. By Lemma 2.5, it
also gives any uncapped agent i the guarantee minj ∈xk Pk (xk − j) ≤ (1 + 4ε)Pi (xi ) for every other
agent k . This guarantee is not meaningful for agent i as the left hand side is in terms of the utility
for agent k . We now show that it implies minj ∈xk ui (xk − j) ≤ (2 + 4ε)ui (xi ), i.e., the utility for i
of k’s bundle minus one item is essentially bounded by twice the utility of i’s bundle for i . The
proof shows that the additional utility for i of the items that k has in excess of i up to one item is
bounded by (1 + ε)ui (xi ). In the case of one copy per good, xk and xi are disjoint and hence any
item in xk is in excess of i’s possession of the same good.
Theorem 2.12. The allocation computed by the algorithm satisesminj ∈xk ui (xk−j) ≤ (2+4ε)ui (xi )
for any agent k and any uncapped agent i .
Proof. Let д be such that Pk (xk − д) ≤ (1 + 4ε)Pi (xi ). Then
ui (xk − д) ≤ ui (xi ∪ xk − д) more never harms
= ui (xi ) +
∑
j
m(j,xk∪xi−д)∑
`=m(j,xi )+1
ui, j, `
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
On Fair Division for Indivisible Items 1:13
≤ ui (xi ) +
∑
j
m(j,xk∪xi−д)∑
`=m(j,xi )+1
αipj since ui, j, `/pj ≤ αi for ` > m(j,xi )
≤ ui (xi ) +
∑
j
m(j,xk−д)∑`
=1
αipj
≤ ui (xi ) +
∑
j
m(j,xk−д)∑`
=1
αi
uk, j, `
αk
since uk, j, `/pj ≥ αk for k ≤ m(j,xk )
≤ ui (xi ) + αiPk (xk − д) denition of Pk (xk − д)
≤ ui (x) + αi (1 + 4ε)Pi (xi ) since Pk (xk − д) ≤ (1 + 4ε)Pi (xi )
= (2 + 4ε)ui (xi ) since ui (xi ) = αiPi (xi ).

For the case of only a single copy per good, minj ∈xk uk (xk − j) ≤ (1 + ε)ui (xi ) holds as was
shown by Barman et al. [3]; see Footnote 1 for a proof. We do not know whether the factor 2 in the
Theorem above is best possible. We show in Section 5 that a factor larger than 1.2 is necessary.
2.5 Polynomial Running Time
Recall that n is the number of agents,m is the number of goods, there are kj copies of good j, and
M =
∑
j kj is the total items. We also dene U = maxi, j,k ui jk/mini, j,k :ui jk,0 as the ratio of the
maximum to minimum non-zero utility.
The analysis follows Barman et al. with one dierence. Lemma 2.14 is new. For its proof, we
need the revised denition of β3.
Lemma 2.13. The price of the least spending uncapped agent is non-decreasing.
Proof. This is clear for price increases. Consider a sequence of swaps along an improving path
P = (i = a0,д1,a1, . . . ,дh ,ah), where the agent ah loses a good, the agents a` , h′ < ` < h, lose and
gain a good, and the agent ah′ gains a good. By Lemma 1, all agents a` with h′ < ` ≤ h have a
price of at least (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) after the swap. Also the price of agent ah′ does not decrease. 
Lemma 2.14. For any agent k , let jk be a highest price item in xk . Then maxk Pk (xk − jk ) does not
increase in the course of the algorithm as long as this value is above (1 + ε)minuncapped i Pi (xi ). Once
maxk Pk (xk − jk ) ≤ (1 + ε)minuncapped i Pi (xi ), the algorithm terminates.
Proof. We rst consider price increases and then a sequence of swaps.
Consider any price increase which is not the last. Then β4 ≤ β3. Let h be the least uncapped
spender after the price increase and q be the price vector after the increase. ThenQh(xh) ≤ Qi (xi ) ≤
rQh(xh). For k ∈ S , we haveminjQk (xk − j) ≤ (1 + ε)Qi (xi ) ≤ (1 + ε)rQh(xh), i.e., agents in S can
become violators but we can bound how bad they can become. For the agent k < S dening β3, we
have
min
j
Pk (x` − j) = β3(1 + ε)rPi (xi ) ≥ (1 + ε)rQi (xi ) ≥ (1 + ε)rQh(xh)
and hence the worst violator stays outside S . We used the equality r = 1 + ε and the inequality
Qi (xi ) = βPi (xi ) ≤ β3Pi (xi ) in this derivation.
Consider next a sequence of swaps. We have an improving path from i to k , say P = (i =
a0,д1,a1, . . . ,дh ,ah = k). Let x ′ be the allocation after the sequence of swaps. Then minj Pk (x ′k −
j) ≤ minj Pk (xk − j) since k loses a good and minj P`(x ′` − j) ≤ (1 + ε)Pi (xi ) for all ` ∈ [0,h − 1] by
Lemma 2.2. 
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Lemma 2.15. The number of subsequent iterations with no change of the least spending agent and
no price increase is bounded by n2M .
Proof. Let i be the least spending agent. We count for any other agent k , how often the
improving path can end in k . For each xed length of the improving path, this can happen at
most M times (for details see [3]). The argument is similar to the argument used in the strongly
polynomial algorithms for weighted matchings [7]. 
Lemma 2.16. If the least spending uncapped agent changes after a price increase, the value of the
old least spending uncapped agent increases by a factor of at least r .
Proof. The least uncapped spender changes if β = β4 and β4 is at least r . So Pi (xi ) increases by
at least r . 
Theorem 2.17. The number of iterations is bounded by n3M2 logr MU .
Proof. Divide the execution into two parts. In the rst part, there are agents that own no good,
and in the second part every agent owns at least one good and hence all the Pi (xi ) are non-zero.
In any iteration of the rst part Pi (xi ) = 0, where i is a least spending agent. An shortest
improving path P = (i = a0,д1,a1, . . . ,дh ,ah) starting in i visits agents a1 to ah−1 owning exactly
one good and ends in agent ah owning more than one good. The sequence of swaps will take away
дh from ah and assign дi+1 to ai for 0 ≤ i < h. Since every price increase will grow S by either a
good or an agent, an improving path will exist after at most n +m iterations. Thus there are only
O(n2) iterations in the rst part.
We come to the second part. Divide its execution into maximum subsequences with the same
least spender. Consider any xed agent i and the subsequences where i is the least spender. At the
end of each subsequence, i receives an additional item, or we have a price increase. In the latter
case, Pi (xi ) is multiplied by at least r . Consider the subsequences between price increases. At the
end of a subsequence i receives an additional item. It may or may not keep this item until the
beginning of the next subsequence. If there are more than M subsequences with i being the least
spender, there must be two subsequences such that i loses an item between these subsequences.
According to Lemma 2.2, the value of i after the swap is at least r times the minimum price of any
bundle and hence at least r times the price of bundle i when i was least spender for the last time.
Thus Pi (xi ) increases by a factor of at least r .
We have now shown: After at most M · n2M iterations with i being the least spender, Pi (xi ) is
multiplied by a factor r . Thus there can be at most n2M2 logr MU such iterations. Multiplication
by n yields the bound on the number of iterations. 
3 A LOWER BOUND ON THE APPROXIMATION RATIO OF THE ALGORITHM
We show that the performance of the algorithm is no better than 1.44. Let k , s and K be positive
integers with K ≥ k which we x later. Consider the following instance. We have h = s(k − 1)
goods of value K and n = h + s goods of value 1. There is one copy of each good. The number of
agents is n and all agents value the goods in the same way.
The algorithm may construct the following allocation. There are h agents that are allocated a
good of value 1 and a good of value K and there are s agents that are allocated a good of value 1.
This allocation can be constructed during initialization. The prices are set to the values and the
algorithm terminates.
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The optimal allocation will allocate a good of value K to h players and spread the h + s = sk
goods of value 1 across the remaining s agents. So s agents get value k each. Thus
NSW(OPT )
NSW(ALG) =
(
Khks
(K + 1)h
)1/(h+s)
=
((
K
K + 1
) (k−1)s
ks
)1/ks
=
(
K
K + 1
) (k−1)/k
k1/k .
The term involving K is always less than one. It approaches 1 as K goes to innity. The second term
k1/k has it maximal value atk = e . However, we are restricted to integral values. We have 21/2 = 1.41
and 31/3 = 1.442. For k = 3, (K/(K + 1))2/3 = exp( 23 ln(1 − 1/(K + 1))) ≈ exp(− 23(K+1) ) ≈ 1 − 23(K+1) .
So for K = 666, the factor is less than 1 − 1/1000 and therefore NSW(OPT )/NSW(ALG) ≥ 1.440.
4 CERTIFICATION OF THE APPROXIMATION RATIO
How can a user of an implementation of the algorithm be convinced that the solution returned has
a NSW no more than 1.445 times the optimum? She may read this paper and convince herself that
the program indeed implements the algorithm described in this article. This is unsatisfactory [11].
In this section, we describe an alternative certicate.
The algorithm returns an allocation xalg , prices pj for the goods, and MBB-ratios αi for the
agents. After scaling all utilities and the utility gap of agent i by αi , we have (3). The user needs to
understand that this scaling has no eect on the optimal allocation. As in Section 2.3, we introduce
the auxiliary problem with M =
∑
j kj goods and one copy of each good. The goods have uniform
utilities. The user needs to understand that the NSW of the auxiliary problem is an upper bound
(Lemma 2.6). We are left with the task of convincing the user of an upper bound on the NSW of
the auxiliary problem.
alpha
c
1 nh n−k+1
uhu1
Fig. 2. The allocation constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.1. The dashed line above agents 1 to n − k
indicates the utility caps. The solid rectangles visualize the values of the bundles.
Theorem 4.1. Let c1 ≥ c2 ≥ . . . ≥ cn be the utility caps of the agents, let u1 ≥ u2 ≥ . . . ≥ uM be
the utilities of theM goods of the auxiliary problem, and let xoptaux be an optimal allocation for the
auxiliary problem. Then
NSW(xoptaux) ≤
( ∏
1≤i≤h
min(ci ,ui ) · δn−h−k ·
∏
n−k+1≤i≤n
ci
)1/n
,
where δ =
(∑
h+1≤j≤M uj −
∑
n−k+1≤i≤n ci
)/(n − h − k) and h and k are such that h < n − k and
cn−k+1 ≤ δ < cn−k and δ < uh . The right hand side is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Proof. We insist that the goods 1 to h are allocated integrally and allow the remaining goods to
be allocated fractionally. Clearly, we cannot allocate more than ci to any agent, in particular, not
to agents n − k + 1 to n and to agents 1 to h. The optimal way to distribute value ∑h+1≤j≤M uj to
agents h + 1 to n is clearly to allocate δ each to agents h + 1 to n − k which all have a cap of more
than δ and to the assign their cap to agents n − k + 1 to n. The items u1 to uh of value more than δ
are best assigned to the agents with the largest utility caps. Assume that two such items, say u`
and uk , are allocated to the same agent. Then one of the rst h agents is allocated no such item; let
v be the value allocated to this agent. Moving uk to this agent and value min(uk ,v) from this agent
in return, does not decrease the NSW. Also, if any fractional items are assigned in addition to the
rst h agents, we move them to agents h + 1 to n − k and increase the NSW. This establishes the
upper bound. 
The upper bound can be computed in time O(n2 +M). We conjecture that it can be computed
in linear time O(n +M). We also conjecture that the bound is never worse than the bound used
in the analysis of the algorithm. It can be better as the following example shows. We have two
uncapped agents and three goods of value u1 = 3, u2 = 1 and u3 = 1, respectively. The algorithm
may assign the rst two goods to the rst agent and the third good to the second agent. The set B
in the analysis of the algorithm consists of the rst good and the last good. Then ` = 1. The optimal
allocation allocates 3 to the rst agent and 2 to the second agent. Thus α` = 2. The analysis uses
the upper bound
√
4 · 2 for the NSW of the optimal allocation. The theorem above gives the upper
bound
√
3 · 2; note that h = 1, k = 0, and δ = 2.
5 ENVY-FREENESS UP TO ONE COPY
For the case of additive valuations and one copy of each good, the optimal allocation is envy-free
up to one good as shown in [4]. Also the allocation constructed by the algorithm by Barman et
al. [3] is envy-free up to one good. In this section, we show that these properties hold neither for
the multi-copy case nor for the capped case.
Let ε be a small positive real, say ϵ = 0.01, let r = 1 + ε , and let s be the smallest power of r
greater or equal to 2r 2. Then 2 < s < 2.04. We rst give an example for the multi-copy uncapped
case. There are two agents and two goods. Good 1 has 5 copies, and good 2 has 2 copies. For
the rst agent, the utility vector for good 1 is (s, s, 0, 0, 0) and for good 2 is (1, 0). For the second
agent, the utility vector for good 1 is (s, s, s, 0, 0) and for good 2 is (s, s). Then at the optimal
NSW allocation, the rst agent is allocated two copies of good 1 and none of good 2, while the
second agent is allocated three copies of good 1 and two copies of good 2. For this allocation,
NSW = (2s · 5s)1/2 = 101/2s . Note that allocating one copy each of the second good to each agent
gives a NSW of ((2s + 1) · 4s)1/2 = (8s2 + 4s)1/2 < (10s2)1/2 since 4 < 2s . The Clearly, the rst agent
envies the second agent even after removing one copy (of either good) from the allocation of the
second agent because u1(x2 − д) ≥ (2s + 1) > 2s = u1(x1) for any choice of д.
Lemma 5.1. In the case of several copies per good, the allocation maximizing NSW is not necessarily
envy-free up to one copy.
What does the algorithm do? The initial assignment is equal to the optimal assignment and sets
p1 = p2 = s and α1 = α2 = 1. Agent 1 is the least spending uncapped agent. The allocation is not ε-p-
EF1, since P1(x1) = 2s and P2(x2) = 5s and minд∈x2 P2(x2 − д) = 4s . The constraints on α1 are [0, 1]
by the rst good and [1/s, 1] by the second good. The tight graph consists only of agent 1. We enter
the else-case of the main loop with S = 1. Then β1 = s > 2, β2 = ∞, β3 = 4s/(2s · r 2) = 2/r 2 < 2
and β4 = r 1+ blogr 5/2c ≥ 5/2 ≥ β3. Thus β = β3. We decrease α1to r 2/2 ≈ 1/2 and terminate. Now
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P1(x1) = (2/r 2) · 2s = 4s/r 2 and hence (1+ 4ε)P1(x1) ≥ 4s = P2(x2 −д) = 4s . The optimal allocation
is now 4ε-p-envy free up to one copy.
We turn to possible improvements of Theorem 2.12. Since minд∈x2 u1(x2 − д) = 2s + 1 and
u1(x1) = 2s , in order to have minд∈x2 u1(x2 −д) ≤ (c + ε)u1(x1), we need c ≥ 1+ (1− 2εs)/(2s) ≥ 1.2.
Lemma 5.2. With α1 = r 2/2, α2 = s , p1 = p2, the optimal allocation in the example above is
4ε-p-envy free up to one copy.
Lemma 5.3. Theorem 2.12 does not hold when the constant 2 is replaced by 1.2.
For the linear capped case, again we have two agents, and this time we have four goods with one
copy each. The utility vectors of both agents are (s, s, s, s), but the rst agent is capped at 3, while
the second agent is uncapped. Then the optimal NSW allocation allocates one good to the rst
agent and three goods to the second agent for NSW = (s · 3s)1/2. Note that allocating 2 copies each
give a NSW = (3 · 2s)1/2 < (3s2)1/2 since s ≥ 2. In the optimal assignment, the rst agent envies
the second agent, even after removing one good from the allocation of the second agent.
What does the algorithm do? It may construct the optimal assignment during initialization; the
prices of all four goods are set to s and both α-values are set to one. Agent 1 is the least spending
uncapped agent. The tight graph consists of the edges from agent 1 to the goods owned by agent 2
and from these goods to agent 1. An improving path exists and one of these goods is reassigned to
agent 1. The algorithm terminates with an allocation in which both agents own two goods.
Lemma 5.4. In the case of single copies per good but with utility caps, the allocation maximizing
NSW is not necessarily envy-free up to one good.
6 LARGE MARKETS
Let δ > 0 be a constant. We call a market δ -large if ui, j, ` ≤ δ · ui (G)/n, where G is the set of all
goods. Note that ui (G) = ∑j ∑1≤`≤kj ui, j, ` . For simplicity, we restrict to instances without utility
caps. With utility caps, the treatment becomes more clumsy, but does not give additional insights.
Theorem 6.1. For a δ -large market in which all non-zero utilities are powers of r = 1 + ε
NSW(x∗)/NSW(xalg) ≤ (1 + 4ε)/(1 − δ ).
Proof. Let (xalg,p,α) be the allocation, price vector, and scaling factors returned by the algo-
rithm. For simplicity we use x = xalg . We scale all utilities ui,∗,∗ by αi . Then αi becomes one and
we have
ui, j,m(j,xi )+1 ≤ pj ≤ ui, j,m(j,xi )
for all i and j. LetU =
∑
i ui (xi ) =
∑
i
∑
j
∑
1≤`≤m(j,xi ) ui, j, ` .
Let x∗ be the allocation maximizing NSW. Then
∑
i ui (x∗i ) ≤ U by Lemma 2.6(a) and hence
NSW(x∗) ≤ ((U /n)n)1/n = U /n.
We next prove a lower bound on NSW(xalg). Note that ui (G) ≤ U due to Lemma 2.6(a). Thus,
ui, j, ` ≤ δU /n.
For any i , we have Pi (xi ) = ui (xi ). Since the allocation returned by the algorithm is 4ε-p-envy-
free up to one copy, we have minд∈xk uk (xk − д) ≤ (1 + 4ε)ui (xi ) for every agent k . Let дk be the
good that minimizes the left hand side. Summing over all k yields∑
k
uk (xk ) −
∑
k
uk (дk ) ≤ (1 + 4ε)n · ui (xi ),
and hence
ui (xi ) ≥ U − n(δ/n)U(1 + 4ε)n =
1 − δ
1 + 4ε ·
U
n
.
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Thus
NSW(x∗)
NSW(xalg) ≤
U /n
(∏i ui (xi ))1/n ≤ U /n(( 1−δ
1+4ε · Un
)n )1/n = 1 + 4ε1 − δ .

7 THE CG- AND BMV-BOUND ARE EQUAL
In this section, we restrict the discussion to the case of a single copy per good and no utility
constraints. We have n agents and m goods. Cole and Gkatzelis [6] and Barman, Murthy, and
Vaish [3] dened upper bounds on the Nash social welfare of any integral allocation of the goods.
We show that the bounds are equivalent.
Cole and Gkatzelis [6] dened their upper bound via spending restricted Fisher markets. Each
agent has one unit of money and each good has one unit of supply. Goods can be allocated
fractionally and xi j is the fraction of good j allocated to agent i . A solution to the market is an
allocation x and a price pj for each good j such that
(1) Each agent spends all his money i.e.,
∑
j xi jpj = 1.
(2) An agent i spends money only on goods with maximum bang-per-buck i.e., xi j > 0 implies
ui j/pj = αi where αi = max` ui`/p` .
(3) Goods with price less than 1 (small goods) are sold completely. Let Ss = {j |pj < 1}. Then
for all j ∈ Ss , ∑i xi j = 1.
(4) Exactly one unit of money is spent on each good with price at least 1 (large good). Let
S` = {j |pj ≥ 1}. Then for all j ∈ S` , ∑i xi jpj = 1.
The last constraint is the spending constraint and gives the market its name. Cole and Gkatzelis [6]
show that the Nash social welfare of any integral allocation of goods to agents is at most
CG-UB :=
(∏
j ∈S`
pj
∏
i
αi
)1/n
.
The following bound is implicit in the work of Barman, Murthy, and Vaish [3]. For any scaling
vector α = (α1, . . . ,αn), dene uniform utilities uj by uj = maxi ui j/αi . For a set S of more than
m − n goods, let
a(S) =
∑
j ∈S uj
|S | − (m − n) =
∑
j ∈S uj
n − |S | ;
note that |S | − (m − n) = n − (m − |S |) = n − |S |. So a(S) is the amount per agent if the total utility
of the goods in S is distributed uniformly over n − |S | agents. Finally, let
Sα = { S ; |S | > m − n and uj > a(S) for j < S }.
Then the BMV-bound is dened as follows:
BMV-UB := min
α>0
min
S ∈Sα
(∏
j<S
uj · a(S)n−|S | ·
∏
i
αi
)1/n
.
Lemma 7.1. BMV-UB is an upper bound on the Nash social welfare of any integral allocation.
Proof. Scaling the utilities of agent i by αi does not change the optimal allocation and changes
the Nash social welfare of any allocation by (∏i αi )1/n . Replacing ui j by uj = maxh uhj for every
agent i can only increase Nash social welfare. Allowing to allocate the goods in S fractionally can
only increase social welfare. Since S is such that uj > a(S) for j < S , the optimal partially fractional
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allocation is to allocate each uj , j < S , to a distinct agent and to allocate a(S) to each one of the
remaining agents. 
Lemma 7.2. For xed α , the BMV-bound is minimized for S ∈ Sα satisfying uj > a(S) for j < S and
uj ≤ a(S) for j ∈ S . This S is unique.
Proof. Assume uh > a(S) for some h ∈ S . Let T = S − h. Then(
uha(T )n−|T |
)1/(n−|S |)
< a(S),
since the LHS is the geometric mean of uh and n − |T | copies of a(T ) and the RHS is equal to their
arithmetic mean; note that (uh + (n − |T |)a(T ))/(n − |S |) = a(S).
We can determine S greedily. Start with S equal to the set of all goods. As long as there is a j ∈ S
such that uj > a(S), remove j from S . For5 such a j, a(S \ j) ≤ a(S) and hence any candidate for
removal stays a candidate for removal. So the removal process always ends up with the same S .
Also note that for |S | = n − 1, a(S) = ∑j ∈S uj ≥ uj for all j ∈ S and hence the process stops before
all goods are removed from S . 
Lemma 7.3. BMV-UB ≤ CG-UB.
Proof. Consider a solution (xi j ,pj ) to the spending restricted Fisher market. The scaling vector
for the BMV-UB is now dened as αi = maxj ui j/pj . Let ui j = ui j/αi be the scaled utilities. Then
ui j ≤ pj and ui j = pj whenever xi j > 0. Let u j = maxi ui j ; then u j = pj since for every j, xi j > 0
for at least one i . Since the total money spent is n, one unit is spent on each good in S` , and pj is
spent on good j ∈ Ss , we have
n =
∑
j ∈Ss
pj + |S` |
and hence
a(Ss ) = u(Ss )
n − |Ss |
=
∑
j ∈Ss pj
n − |S` | = 1.
Since pj > 1 for j ∈ S` and pj ≤ 1 for j ∈ Ss , the BMV-UB is minimized for the set Ss ∈ Sα and
hence
BMV-UB ≤
(∏
j ∈S`
pj · a(Ss )n−|S` | ·
∏
i
αi
)1/n
=
(∏
j ∈S`
pj
∏
i
αi
)1/n
= CG-UB.

For a set S of more thanm − n goods, let PS be the following minimization problem in variables
αi and uj .
minimize fS (α ,u) :=
∑
j<S
lnuj+(n − |S |) lna(S) +
∑
i
lnαi
subject to uj ≥ ui j/αi for all i and j
uj ≥ a(S) for j < S
If PS is feasible, let bS be the optimum objective value and let (αS ,uS ) be an optimum solution.
If S is the set of all goods, αi = 1 for all i and uj = maxi ui j is feasible solution. Let S∗ be such
that (1) PS∗ is feasible, (2) bS∗ is minimum, and (3) among the S satisfying (1) and (2), S has largest
cardinality.
5Let k = n − |S |. Then a(S \ j) = (u(S ) − uj )/(k − 1) ≤ u(S )/k = a(S ) i u(S ) ≤ kuj i a(S ) ≤ uj .
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Lemma 7.4. For S = S∗, uSj > a(S) for j < S , uSj ≤ a(S) for j ∈ S , and uSj = maxi ui j/αi .
Proof. Assume rst that uSh > a(S) for some h ∈ S . Consider T = S − h. Then (αS ,uS ) is a
feasible solution of PT and bT < bS by the proof of Lemma 7.2.
Assume next that uSh = a(S) for some h < S . Let T = S ∪ h. Then (αS ,uS ) is a feasible solution
for PT and bT = bS , a contradiction to the choice of S .
Assume uSj > maxi ui j/αi for some j. Since uSj > a(S) if j < S , we may decrease uSj , staying
feasible and decreasing the objective. 
Lemma 7.5. Let S = S∗. Then (αS , S) denes the BMV-bound.
Proof. Let (αBMV, SBMV) dene the BMV-bound and let uBMVj = maxi ui j/αBMVi for all j. Then
(αBMV,uBMV) is a feasible solution of PSBMV and
fSBMV (αBMV,uBMV) =
1
n
ln BMV-UB.
Therefore
bS∗ ≤ bSBMV ≤
1
n
ln BMV-UB.
Conversely, let S = S∗, let (αS ,uS ) be an optimal solution to PS , and let Sα S be the set minimizing
the BMV-bound for αS Then Sα S = S∗ by Lemma 7.4 and hence
1
n
ln BMV-UB ≤ bS∗ .

Lemma 7.6. CG-UB ≤ BMV-UB.
Proof. Let S = S∗ and let (αS ,uS ) be an optimal solution of problem PS . We have shown
above that (αS , S) denes the BMV-bound, and that uSj > a(S) for j < S , uSj ≤ a(S) for j ∈ S , and
uSj = maxi ui j/αi . Let k = n − |S |.
The KKT conditions are necessary conditions for the optimum. Let zi j ≥ 0 for all i and j, and
yj ≥ 0 for j < S be the multipliers. Then we need to have (write ujαi ≥ ui j for the inequalities)
1/uSj =
∑
i
zi jα
S
i + yj for j < S
1
a(S) =
∑
i
zi jα
S
i for j ∈ S
1/αSi =
∑
j
zi ju
S
j for all i
zi j > 0⇒ αSi uSj = ui j for all i and j
yj > 0⇒ uSj = a(S) for all j < S .
Dene pj = uSj /a(S) and xi j = a(S)zi jαSi and call pj the price of good j and xi j the fraction of good
j allocated to agent i . The bang-per-buck ratio of agent i is
αi = max
j
ui j
pj
=
αSi u
S
j
uSj /a(S)
= a(S)αSi .
We now rewrite and interpret the optimality conditions.
• Since uSj > a(S) for j < S , yj = 0 for j < S .
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• The rst condition becomes 1 = ∑i xi jpj , i.e., exactly one unit of money is spent on each
good j < S . Note that pj > 1 for such goods.
• The third condition becomes 1 = ∑j xi jpj , i.e., every agent spends exactly one unit of
money.
• The second condition becomes ∑i xi j = 1 for all j ∈ S , i.e. goods in S are completely
allocated, but not overallocated.
• xi j > 0 implies zi j > 0 which in turn implies that αSi uSj = ui j . Hence ui j/pj = a(S)αSi = αi
which means that good j is allocated to i only if it has the maximum bang-per-buck ratio.
This shows that the pair (x ,p) is a solution to the spending restricted Fisher market and the
CG-bound for this solution is
CG-UB ≤
∏
j<S
uSj
a(S) ·
∏
i
a(S)αSi =
∏
j<S
uSj · a(S)n−|S | ·
∏
i
αSi = BMV-UB.

We have now shown the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 7.7. The CG-bound and the BMV-bound have the same value.
In [5, Lemma 8] yet another mathematical program is given for the same bound. We include it
for completeness.
maximize
∏
i
∏
j u
bi j
i j∏
j q
qj
j
subject to
∑
i
bi j = qj for all j∑
j
bi j = 1 for i
qj ≤ 1 for all j
bi j ≥ 0 for all i and j .
In the optimal solution to this program bi j is the amount of money spent by agent i on good j , and
qj is the total spending on good j in the spending restricted market.
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